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Turkish journalist) some people in Eastern Europe who would like to return to the old policy of oppression of the Slavonic peoples. . . . The new friendship among these peoples, related to each other and bound by century-old ties of a common culture, was being tempered in the crucible of the war of liberation. . . . Their *rapprochement* would displease none but those who dreamed of seeing them dominated once again'. 186* 829 204

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The Orlemanski affair has shown us an attempt at Slav solidarity in the domain of religious tolerance. In the same order of things, but this time in connection with the Orthodox Slavs, we cannot omit to mention the deep impression produced by the restoration of juridical personality to the Russian Orthodox Church (September, 1943) and the elevation of the Metropolitan Serge to the office of Patriarch, abolished in 1721 by Peter the Great and which enjoyed a brief restoration in 1917. With its hundred and fifty million followers, the Orthodox community, placed at the cross-roads of the war, was undergoing one of the most tragic crises in its history. Its suffering was all the more serious, inasmuch as the Orthodox Churches are organised on national lines, in contrast to the hierarchical unity of Roman Catholicism. These churches are bound together by identical doctrine and canons. But, in the course of the centuries, they have progressively relaxed the bonds of dependence which used to attach them to the Œcumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Religious autonomy has advanced side by side with the emancipation of the nationalities. In restoring the rights of the Church, Stalin not only indicated his desire to reawaken the traditions of Russian national life, within the framework of a social renovation; he also tightened the historic bonds between his country and the Balkan nations of the Orthodox religion, thus reinforcing, by new spiritual affinities, sympathies founded on community of race, of oppression, and of destiny. 186* 659 796

Germany tried to foil this policy by summoning to Vienna, on November 5, under the presidency of the Metropolitan of Belgrade, the Orthodox prelates adhering to the Axis cause, and especially the Metropolitans of Berlin and of Paris, who declared the election of the new Patriarch to be null and void. This demonstration was of no effect; the vast majority of the Serbian, Rumanian, Greek and Bulgarian hierarchies either had nothing 648 793 795

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666 National Front 80–90 per cent of the votes cast.[4] It is true that
829 the Opposition abstained from voting (its Belgrade organ,
175 *Demokratia*, was suspended) and that the electoral system favoured the Coalition Government. But the Anglo-Americans took no action. They declared the results of the poll to be 'acceptable'. On these results were based the two Assemblies (Union Assembly and Assembly of the Nationalities) which, following Russian lines, were to control the country's constitutional life.

578 In short, both at home and abroad, Tito was master of the
643 situation. He had armed forces, the levers of control, fanatical partisans, a 'Youth' following, attached to a régime which had radically reorganised the whole staffing of the army, the administrative services, and diplomacy. But certain large sections of opinion were not with him. In the provinces the old parties were still solidly rooted. Those circles criticised the 'personal' and 'plebiscite' character of the régime, which was an unprecedented innovation in Serbian political life. Against the Marshal were the Monarchists, the old army, Serbian nationalism, Croat par-
• [659] ticularism, Slovene 'Clericalism'. For a long time he alienated the Catholic clergy; on October 18, Radio-Vatican broadcast a letter from the Yugoslav bishops to the Belgrade Government, accusing the latter of systematically persecuting the Roman Church.

And this was only criticism of internal affairs. Tito was further reproached with having reorganised relations between the Yugoslav populations on anachronistic bases. How would this State turn out—a State of twelve million inhabitants, with six autonomous Governments, capped with a Federal Government? Where would the frontiers of Croatia and Serbia be? And those of Serbia and Macedonia? Could the Macedonian question be considered as settled by the granting of autonomy? And would not the Bulgaro-Yugoslav *entente*, advertised as a victory for the régime, be submitted to a severe test when autonomy gave rise to political disputes in this country which, for a century, had been torn by undercurrents of passion and foreign intrigue? Was

666 [4] According to official statistics, out of 8,383,455 electors and 7,413,214 votes cast, 6,574,975 went to the National Front. The franchise had been given to women; the electoral age had been lowered to 18, and even lower for those who had fought in the liberation.

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645 Communists, then rejoined the partisans in Bosnia and was
175 elected President of the National Liberation Front.

687 The chief event of this period was the trial of General Draja
175 Mihailovich, who had organised the earliest resistance to the invader, but was subsequently accused of collaboration with the Germans and the Italians. Arrested on the borders of Bosnia and Serbia, he was court-martialled on June 10, 1946, by the Military Tribunal of Belgrade, which condemned him to death on July 15. He was shot. Some American airmen had vainly asked to bear witness in his favour. The Belgrade Government had documents published establishing his 'treason'; they reveal undeniable complicity with the enemy in the lower ranks, and, especially, the implacable intention of eliminating the Communists from the Resistance; the role of Mihailovich himself is less clearly shown—which explains the emotion his condemnation aroused in England and in America.

[829] The *Daily Telegraph* thus expressed itself on this condemnation: 'The long perspective of history will enable the truth about the much-discussed figure of Mihailovich to be more clearly perceived. His contemporaries can do no more than think that, caught up in the whirlwind of events beyond his control, he was a victim of Fate'.

In the same connection the British statesman, Noel Baker, declared that the decision to suspend aid to Mihailovich during the war had been taken as the result of numerous denunciations from various sources, alleging that he was no longer adequately contributing to the war effort. 'Subsequently', he said, 'it became evident that certain of his lieutenants were actively collaborating with the Germans'.

793 No less sensational was the trial of the Catholic Archbishop
687 of Zagreb, Mgr. Aloysius Stepinac. This followed proceedings
175 against numerous members of his clergy, notably that involving
• 657 some Slovene priests, in December, 1945, at Ljubljana. The bishop of that town, Mgr. Rozman, a refugee in Italy, was condemned to eighteen years' imprisonment.

[208] The action against the Croatian priests accused of collaboration was prepared in January, 1946, by a violent press and radio campaign, denouncing the Archbishop's relations with the *Oustachi* of Pavelich, by whom he had been decorated (in

62 Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16

common with the Croatian Orthodox Metropolitan, Hermogene Maximov, and the German Lutheran bishop, Popov).

Arrested on September 18, 1946, Mgr. Stepinac was tried, on the 30th of the same month, not only on the charge of intelligence with the enemy, but also of having, after the liberation, worked with the opponents of the régime. These charges (as well as that of having forcibly converted Orthodox Christians to Catholicism) were upheld by the judges, who condemned the prelate (on October 11) to sixteen years' hard labour, to the loss of his civic rights for a period of five years, and to the confiscation of all his possessions. In vain had the defence recalled the fact that Mgr. Stepinac had protested against the racial laws and collective reprisals, and that the allied press had, while the war was actually in progress, rendered homage to his courageous stand.[5]

Pope Pius XII, in a public speech, protested against this verdict, denying the compulsory conversions—which, moreover, are contrary to canon law. And, although Tito had declared that the proceedings were by no means the prelude to a campaign against the Church in Czechoslovakia, Christian circles throughout the world protested against what they called a 'religious trial'. The 115 Catholic archbishops and bishops of the United States, assembled in Washington for their annual Assembly, described the verdict as 'an outrage on justice'. The Archbishop of Westminster declared that, during the war, 'in Croatia the only voice raised against Nazism and its works had been that of Archbishop Stepinac'.

The Vatican, in an unofficial note, recalled the Church's sanctions against members of the laity sitting in judgement on a bishop, or guilty of any act of violence upon his person; it nevertheless continued to maintain its Nuncio in Belgrade—Mgr. Patrick Hurley, a priest of American nationality, who had entered upon his office at the beginning of the year. In October, 1946, it appointed a co-adjutor to the Bishop of Maribor and another to the Bishop of Ljubljana. (In the absence of a

[5] A Catholic Agency announced, at the end of February 1947, that the President of the Croatian Government, Dr. Bakarich, was said to have invited the prelate to sign his appeal, giving him reason to hope that he might be liberated and, with American support, go abroad. Mgr. Stepinac refused, not wishing to leave either his people or his diocese.

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Concordat in Yugoslavia, the Vatican proceeds directly to the appointment of bishops, without previous agreement with the Government.)

Relations between the Holy See and Belgrade again became strained when on January 31, 1947, Tito's Government handed to the Secretariat of State two notes, demanding the handing over of five Yugoslav 'war criminals', said to have taken refuge in the Vatican, and accusing the latter of having facilitated the escape to South America of other Yugoslav nationals, wanted by their country's police. The Pope denied these allegations, but added 'that he distinguished between those who were persecuted for political reasons, and criminals; to the former he gave every assistance in his power, without asking whence they came'.

Yugoslavia's external policy remained unshakeably based on Soviet support. 'The Slav peoples now look to Moscow as, after 1919, they looked to Paris; nothing is more natural', said a semi-official commentary on Tito's tour of Central Europe. Far from endeavouring to gain the confidence of the English and the Americans, whose co-operation a wise diplomacy would have sought, in order to bring their claims on Trieste to a successful conclusion, the Belgrade Government was continually in conflict with those powers.

Its relations with Washington were particularly chequered. On January 8, 1946, President Truman had declared: 'As regards Yugoslavia, recognition of the present Government is still subject to certain conditions'. (Moreover, he put Rumania and Bulgaria on the same footing.)

These 'conditions' were the assurance that the new Yugoslavia would recognise the existing treaties and agreements between the two countries (commercial exchanges, extraditions, naturalisations, etc.). Having obtained this assurance on April 18, he recognised Tito and appointed Mr. Richard Patterson ambassador in Belgrade. 'In granting diplomatic recognition', said the *Washington Post* next day, 'the United States are but looking unpleasant realities in the face'.

And when Sava Kosanovich, the representative of Yugoslavia, presented his credentials to President Truman, the latter said to him, with bantering courtesy: 'The United States are following, with interest and sympathy, the efforts of the Yugoslav people . . . to succeed, individually and in harmony with the United

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tion, and the reconstruction of German economic life subordinated to the reconstruction of the devastated countries.

On the United Nations' Security Council the Polish delegation fastened on the Spanish problem, displaying all the more energy, inasmuch as none of their positive interests was at stake. They backed the views supported by France and the Soviet Union on rupture with Franco, and decided, on April 5, 1946, to recognise the Giral Government--an eminently platonic gesture, for Franco's Spain and Poland had no diplomatic relations.

The religious question, too, was a serious preoccupation of the Government, which refuted the widespread accusation of wishing to persecute the Catholic Church. It had, moreover, always included 'practising' Catholics among its members, for Poland is certainly one of the few countries where 'Leftists' are just as good Catholics as 'Rightists'. Cardinal Hlond, Primate of Poland and Archbishop of Warsaw, himself declared that, in spite of the denunciation of the Concordat of 1925, and the absence of relations between Chruch and State, there was no question of a Kulturkampf in Poland.

There is no doubt; however, that the law (which came into force on January 1, 1946) rendering civil marriage compulsory and authorising divorce conflicted with the consciences of a large section of the population. The education reforms had dealt a death-blow to the religious schools. In the face of these measures, the Church adopted an attitude of restrained disapproval, in order not to make the situation worse; moreover, she had her 'Red Bishops', such as Mgr. Adamski, Bishop Katowice, whose sympathies were known to lie with the Soviet Union.

One of the reasons why the hierarchy avoided clashes was the fear of reviving accusations brought against certain of their members as the result of their attitude during the occupation; this in spite of the courageous conduct of the enormous majority of the prelates, and the murder by the Germans of four bishops and two thousand priests.

It was, moreover, evident that the Warsaw Government's hostility was directed less against the Polish Church than against the Vatican, which they reproached with its policy during the war and its attitude in certain actions brought against agents of the occupying authorities. Yet M. Osubka-Morawski likewise

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accused the hierarchy, in connection with the Kielce pogrom,[18] of not having adopted a sufficiently bold attitude towards anti-Semitism, and of having refused to sign the declaration of all political parties, condemning this racial crime.

The Cardinal addressed to the foreign press declarations in which, while deploring the acts of violence, he attributed them largely 'to the dominant position assumed by the Jews in the Polish Government, and to the efforts made to give Poland a governmental structure that the majority of the country did not desire'. As may be imagined, these words aroused passionate comments. The same remark applies to the pastoral letter addressed to the faithful on the eve of the elections, asking them to vote only 'for persons, lists or programmes in favour of Catholic teaching and morals'. Without mentioning the Marxist Parties by name, the pastoral reminded Catholics that they must not belong to 'organisations whose principles are contrary to this teaching and this morality'. The Cardinal was anxious, he said, to 'reconcile the Christian faith with a sound revolutionary movement'.

* * *

It was in Czechoslovakia that the adaptation of political and social life to the new state of affairs was achieved with the minimum of clashes and the maximum of realism. The Second Republic was stabilised under the form of a 'Socialising Democracy' (according to President Benes's term), half-way between Communism and the Bourgeois State. It no longer had the same exterior structure as Masaryk's republic, having adopted a *sui generis* type of bi-national community, with equal rights for Czechs and Slovaks. There was another innovation—a still more vital one—the elimination of minorities, whose presence and militancy had hindered its development, before contributing to its dislocation under the Hitlerian onrush.

[18] In this locality,[1] on July 4, 1946, there was a pogrom, arising out of a trifling cause, in the course of which 45 Jews were massacred. Nine of the presumed authors of this massacre were condemned to death. The clandestine organisations were accused of having fomented anti-Semite passions, whereas, in reality, the latter had remained very much alive in Poland—as witness the testimony of Dr. Shoskes, South America's representative in the Society for Assistance to Jewish Immigrants, and M. Segal, delegate to the World Jewish Congress of New York. Despite the frightful losses they suffered during the occupation, which reduced them to an insignificant minority, the Polish Jews, for the most part, aspire to leave the country. This is one of the indirect aspects of the Palestinian problem.

1 [in Kielce - Analyst]

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Chapter Seven

ORTHODOXY AND PANSLAVISM

IN the renewal of the spirit of Slavonic solidarity an important place must be attributed to the action of Orthodoxy.

The Muscovite Patriarchate, almost as soon as it was reconstituted on new juridical bases and assured of the Kremlin's support, set out to reconquer the communities who had relaxed their ties as a result of the Bolshevist Revolution, thereby renewing a Russian tradition which dates from Ivan III. The spiritual object of this pacific crusade was to restore union and harmony to the Orthodox or 'Pravoslav' world. But its political objective, though not openly avowed, was none the less obvious; the Moscow Government sought to extend its influence by having recourse to the 'armour of light' of which the Apostle speaks.

This campaign met with no canonical obstacle, since, among the Pravoslavs, there is no primacy of jurisdiction. But it *did* meet with resistance from the autocephalous 'national' tendencies of the various Orthodox Churches—tendencies which had been affirmed in the States created or enlarged by the First World War and in which the hierarchy had seized the opportunity of breaking away from the spiritual control of the Phanar (Constantinople Patriarchate).

But the weight of Soviet power enabled the Russian clergy easily to overcome the prejudices felt by the national Churches against any moral control exercised outside their State frontiers. For this purpose the clergy borrowed their arguments from the Muscovite temporal power, that is to say, they posed as champions of proletarian emancipation, and exploited the Orthodox Slavs' old prejudices against the Catholic Church. Whilst the Patriarch Alexis visited the Christian communities of the Middle East to restore the 'primacy of honour' of the Russian Church in the Orthodox Pentarchy (Moscow, Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, Jerusalem), the Metropolitan Alexis of Juroslav went to the United States to try to rally the section of Orthodox emigrants who resisted the authority of the Patriarch of Moscow.

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But it goes without saying that it was upon the Churches of the Balkan States that Muscovite influence was exercised most directly and decisively. In Yugoslavia the hierarchy created at Sremski Karlovtsi by Russian exiles, and which Mgr. Antoine, ex-Archbishop of Kiev, had organised immediately after the First World War, was dissolved and had to go into exile. A Russian delegation, presided over by the Metropolitan Serge of Odessa, went to present a mitre to Joseph, Metropolitan of Serbia, in February, 1946. The real object of this mission, which spent a month in Belgrade, was to define the future relations between the Yugoslav Church and the Muscovite Church.

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Then arose the case—a rather complicated one, it must be confessed—of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch, Mgr. Gavrilo. The latter had been accused by the Germans of having hidden part of the Crown treasure; he was interned, then taken to Dachau. When the Allies occupied Bavaria, he preferred retirement to Italy to a return to his country, where he was being begged to resume his duties. He adopted an attitude of opposition towards the régime established by Marshal Tito, as shown [798] by his pastoral letter of Easter, 1946. The Serbian Orthodox Church had been rather badly treated by this régime, for she had been deprived of the education of the young, religious marriage had been declared invalid in law, and she had lost most of her property. It is said that it was under the influence of the Russian clergy that her Metropolitans invited the Patriarch to return. He did, in fact, return on November 14, 1946, and had an interview with Tito, during which 'all misunderstandings were cleared up'. And, as proof of this, at the Slav Congress in Belgrade on December 11, he made a speech in which, after having recalled the sacrifices made for the 'safeguarding of truth, the application of justice, and the defence of liberty', he manifested his joy at finding that the Slavonic peoples 'sorely tried by the bitter experience of their recent and remote past, were expending all their energy in their spiritual unity'. 'Slav solidarity', he concluded, 'is manifested, today more than ever, with the help of our mother, Russia, and of Generalissimo Stalin; it is the surest guarantee of the development of the Slavonic peoples'.

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In Bulgaria the clergy, after seventy-five years of schism, returned to nominal obedience to the Patriarchate of Con-

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stantinople, in agreement with the Muscovite hierarchy. The thousandth anniversary of the death of the anchorite, Saint John of Rila, restorer of Bulgarian monastic life, was the occasion, in May, 1946, of impressive solemnities which were attended by the Patriarch Alexis. It was the second time in ten centuries that the head of the Russian Church had visited the monastery. He officiated in person. The head of the Communist Party, George Dmitrov, took the opportunity of reminding the Bulgarian clergy that they should no longer look back towards the fallen régime:—

'Today we can ask that our Church shall remain faithful to her millenial traditions and become, in fact, a Republican Church, by ceasing to render homage to the dynasty and the monarchs who have betrayed the Bulgarian nation. Let our Fathers in the Holy Synod and all honest servants of the Church understand that today we are living in new times, that they must on no account thwart the aspirations of the people, and that they may take example from the chiefs of the Russian Orthodox Church'.

We can fully understand this warning only if we visualise the state of latent tension existing in the relations between the Church and the Bulgarian State since the liberation. It had shown itself, since the month of January, 1946, in a protest from the Exarch, Mgr. Stephan, against the prohibition of religious instruction in the schools. Since the new Constitution provided for the separation of the Churches and the State, the Bulgarian Holy Synod announced in December, 1946, that, while remaining hostile to this separation, it would nevertheless accept it if the Charter surrounded the exercise of the Church's spiritual mission with juridical guarantees. Moreover, it demanded that lay instruction should be neither anti-religious nor anti-Christian, but strictly neutral.

At the same time, in order to create conditions facilitating adaptation to the new state of affairs, it announced a programme of reforms destined to 'democratise' the internal régime of the Church and to bring its principles more in line with those of popular power.

So that, in Bulgaria, the separation did not appear as persecution; it was manifested rather by a strengthening of the autocephalous character of the Church, too closely bound up

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186* with Bulgarian national life to be neglected by the new régime, •659 which will continue to subsidise it, and counts upon its co-operation in rallying the masses; in which, moreover, it is assured of the goodwill of Mgr. Stephan and his clergy. On August 28, at the Bachkovo pilgrimage, Mgr. Cyrille, Metropolitan of Plovdiv, made a speech urging the faithful to vote, at the referendum, for the Republic and against 'the abhorred monarchy, whose role', he said, 'has been as fatal in the history of the country as in that of the Church'.

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185 Whereas, in the Balkan countries, the religious problem lay in getting the clergy to forget that they had, for some centuries, been the support of the monarchical institution, it had a quite different aspect among the Western Slavs, where the problem was, first and foremost, the liquidation of Uniatism.

175 As the reader will know, the 'Act of Union' (hence the word 795 'Uniat') was concluded three and a half centuries ago, in 1596, 648 at Brest-Litowsk, where the Metropolitan of Kiev acclaimed the renewal with Rome of the Union of Florence. As a result, since that date there had been flourishing communities 'of the Oriental rite', which recognised Papal supremacy while keeping their national liturgy and their discipline—which, among other regulations, permits (as the Orthodox Church does) the clergy to marry. These communities today number in all about two million followers, especially in territories formerly incorporated in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

[329] Uniatism had always been regarded by the Russians as a 'turning movement' on the part of the Roman Catholic Church, supported first by Poland, then by Austria-Hungary, to detach the Orthodox from their traditional faith. Urban VII's apostrophe: 'Ruthenians, the East will be conquered by you!' has obsessed the Muscovite Church, which has never ceased to endeavour to recapture its positions.

After the fall of the Tsarist régime this Church's efforts were paralysed by the crisis she was herself experiencing, and by the official atheism professed by the Soviet State. The Holy See sought to take advantage of this crisis to restore the 'seamless robe of Christ'. It gave repeated proofs of solicitude, placing the Uniats on a footing of complete equality with their brethren of the Latin rite. It cherished the hope, thanks to these Uniats,

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Church of St. Charles Borromeo, assigned to the Orthodox cult. They were discovered, and, after a regular siege, killed themselves rather than fall into the enemy's hands. The Orthodox Bishop Gorazd and his assistants, who had hidden them, were executed. And their church, which had just given marytrs to the national cause, was dissolved, and the cathedral turned into a shop.

After the liberation this church was restored to its rights and transferred (in April, 1946) from the jurisdiction of the Serbian Patriarchate to that of the Moscow Patriarchate, which raised Prague to the rank of an Archbishopric. On the following May 19 there arrived in the capital Mgr. Jelevferij, Exarch of the Patriarch of Moscow and Archbishop of Prague, who was received by the members of the Government and the Russian Orthodox Archbishop, Mgr. Sergej. The first service celebrated by the prelate was offered in memory of Bishop Gorazd.

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In the following June Karpov, President of the Soviet's Council of State for Orthodox Affairs, gave a talk on 'Religion in Russia' to officers of the Czechoslovak Army, to emphasise the liberty of divine worship permitted under the Soviet régime, and the clergy's loyalty to the State.[7]

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As in the time of the Tsars, Catholicism has again become the 'sore point' of the Slavonic community. Soviet Russia, which had so ostentatiously dissociated itself from the religious tradition of the Slavophiles, has rediscovered the latter on its line of expansion. The Kremlin has, by the force of circumstances, been obliged to play the Orthodox card in the regions placed within its sphere of influence. But action is followed by reaction. If Uniatism is retreating before Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism represents, in Poland, in Slovakia, in Croatia, in Slovenia, a basis of resistance to Russian penetration in its twofold aspect of Marxism and schism. With the result that one would need the gift of prophecy to be able to say, today,

assassination of Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. Bishop Gorazd, Cikli, a parish priest, and Petzek, a curate, who sheltered the two heroes, were discovered on June 18.

[7] The reconstituted Hussite Church aspired to the role of an official Church; it held a Congress at the beginning of January 1946, and its Primate, M. Kovar, presented the new bishops to M. Benes on the 23rd of that month. The President advised him to co-operate with the other Churches of the West and the East, taking care, however, not to mix politics and religion. The Church numbers 850,000 members.

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whether the gains which Orthodoxy confers on Soviet influence will or will not be offset by the opposition it revives or awakens.

The mind is struck by an anomaly—the cheerful alacrity with which the Orthodox hierarchy condemned régimes whose merits it had so often praised, and under which it had lived for so long. It is quite remarkable that, despite their national character, the Balkan Churches did not change their spiritual leaders at a time when the State was undergoing a political, social, and moral revolution. It would be possible to compile an 'Anthology of Repudiation' by publishing the speeches of the Patriarchs who have remained in office. To condemn the régime under which they were appointed, they have found as many arguments as they formerly invoked to justify it. It is true that the Orthodox Church is essentially more 'democratic' than the Roman Church. But this inconsequentiality on the part of its leaders has not increased its authority, any more than that of the Catholic hierarchy has been strengthened by the time-serving attitude of certain prelates towards the Hitlerian order.

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642 175 563 the preceding Constitutions, this one contained no clause designed to protect minorities.

[666] The elections, postponed until May 30,[1] gave 88 per cent of the votes (6,429,145) to the National Front, but the figure of 770,100 blank voting slips exceeded that anticipated by the Government. The latter was, however, fully master of the situation. On June 14 Clement Gottwald was elected President of the Republic, on the unanimous vote of the 296 deputies present. Under the chairmanship of Zapotocki, he formed a Cabinet on the lines of the previous one (sixteen Communists or supporters, and six non-Communists); the portfolio of Foreign Affairs remained in the hands of Klementis, who replaced Masaryk. The new Head of the Government announced implacable repressive action against 'those guilty of disorder or confusion, who seek to hinder the reconstruction of the country'.

[661] • 659 798 175 Indeed, during the months that followed, there was a vigorous purging of diplomacy, the army, the police. But, in 1949, it was the religious question which was to dominate political life, owing to an offensive conducted against the Roman Church, opposing the old Czech Hussite spirit to Catholicism, the dominant trait in the Slovak national character.

Gottwald and his ministers, relying on this 'religious geography' peculiar to Czechoslovakia, embarked upon a struggle with the clergy in the domain of monopoly of the schools. They pursued the contest by seeking to alienate the Catholic Church from her natural hierarchy, and by encouraging the 'schism' of the Czech 'National' Church. To protest against the obstacles put in the way of the exercise of the cult, the bishops drew up a pastoral letter, setting forth the conditions required in order to regularise relations between the Church and the State. The Government forbade the distribution of the pastoral; infringements of this decree, specially numerous in Slovakia, were firmly repressed. Mgr. Beran, Archbishop of Prague, was detained in his palace; the civil authority created 'Catholic Action', an official organisation placed under the control of priests with Communist leanings. At the head of this movement was the Minister of Public Health, Father Plojhar, suspended by the ecclesiastical authorities for having sought a legislative mandate without his bishop's permission.

Tension rose with the 'resolutions' passed on June 28 by the

1 [1948 -- Analyst]

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Congregation of the Holy Office, forbidding the publication and diffusion of Communist doctrine.

So the *Kulturkampf* was waged, now energetically, now quietly. The Prague Government was accused by the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, of violating 'human dignity and civilisation'; once more the conflict passed from the national to the international level, symbolising the ideological antagonism which exists between the Soviet world and the Western democracies. Neither the Government nor the clergy showed any signs of weakening. On November 17 the bishops again asked the civil power to abandon the laws relating to religious teaching, as conceived by the State, and the interference of lay authorities in the nomination of priests and the administration of Church property.

The end of the year 1949 was marked by waves of purges in Communist circles, and by fresh trials on charges of treason, incriminating, like those of Budapest and Sofia, Tito's 'agents' or 'accomplices'.

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During this period politics in Poland were somewhat less sensational than in the other Slav countries. There again, however, the régime of 'popular democracy' evolved in the direction of Stalin-Marxism. The struggle against the Church was less open, and did not, as in Czechoslovakia, go to the length of making the clergy civil servants. The Government concentrated its efforts particularly on increasing exports, on economic reconstruction, and on exploiting the German lands brought under its control—and these efforts, it must be admitted, were attended with remarkable results.

The German Question was its chief external problem; in its view, it was France's policy in respect of the Reich which prevented the renewal of the Franco-Polish treaty of alliance. What Warsaw particularly feared was lest a change of attitude on the part of the Allies towards Germany should reopen the question of the Oder-Neisse frontier, which the Poles considered sacrosanct, but which transferred to them territories whose final allocation was, legally, postponed until the making of the peace treaty for the Reich.

The most sensational event was the nomination (on November 7)[1] of Rokossovsky, the Soviet Marshal (of Polish

1 [1949--Analyst]

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disciples of Methodius made their influence felt that Christianity as religion made real progress among the Serbs, and even so, many pagan customs were retained and, more or less, blended with the new Faith. But the official conversion of the Serbs is dated from the baptism of Mutimir. During his reign the Serbian Church was under the direct influence of Byzantium and the services were in Greek. But as Bulgarian ascendency became predominant in the Balkans, Byzantine suzerainty gradually gave place to Bulgarian, and the Greek liturgy to the Slavonic. 797

The first Bulgarian king to receive baptism was Boris who reigned from 852 to 889 and was one of the ablest monarchs in Bulgarian history. Christianity had penetrated into Bulgaria before that time, and there had even been some persecution of it, due largely to fear of it as an agent which prepared the way for foreign and, in particular, for Byzantine domination. Boris was a statesman and although his own personal religious convictions played their part in his acceptance of Christianity, there were other considerations also that he had in mind. To make his realm a Christian State was some defence against the political and religious missionary zeal of his Christian neighbours. Further, it would tend to consolidate his own position. The great bulk of his subjects were Slavs, and many of them already Christian; the Bulgars were a ruling minority among whom Boris was the chief of many rulers. To favour the Slav element in his realm, therefore, and to Christianize it would be to break the power of the Bulgarian nobility and establish himself as sole ruler with all the force of the current Christian conception of royalty and the divine authority delegated to kings, to support him. The revolt of the Bulgarian nobles which subsequently broke out showed that they realized all this clearly enough, but they were too late. 659

In furtherance of his plans Boris looked first towards Rome for the same reason that Rastislav of Moravia had looked to Constantinople, i.e., each looked to the opponents of those from whom their own danger was greatest. But the Byzantine Emperor and Photius, then at the height of his quarrel with the Pope, were just as much alive to the facts and struck first. 659 648

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648 Boris found his country invaded and himself compelled to receive baptism at Greek hands. Accepting the situation, Boris now set himself to achieve the independence of the Bulgarian Church and with much astuteness availed himself of the bargaining power which the quarrel between Rome and Constantinople placed in his hands. He would have preferred to align himself with the West, and he made urgent and persistent efforts to induce the Pope to give him a Patriarch of his own. Pope Nicholas, who saw a chance of recovering for the Papacy the jurisdiction of which Leo III had deprived it, gladly sent Boris a couple of bishops, Latin service books and much good instruction (in answer to Boris's questions), but not a Patriarch. So Greek priests and books were turned out and Latin took their place and Boris continued patiently but urgently to press his request. But the Pope's star was in the ascendant, in 867 the Byzantine Emperor was assassinated, and the Patriarch Photius deposed. Feeling the ball at his feet the Pope ignored Boris's requests and adopted a high-handed policy towards him.

Boris lost patience and turned to Constantinople, which was ready enough to receive his overtures. But in view of the fact that a Council had been called to try to settle the differences between the two great sees, the question of the Bulgarian Church was submitted to it. The Council was packed with Eastern bishops, and in spite of the protests of the Papal legates who were present, naturally it was decided that the Bulgarian Church should be under the jurisdiction of Constantinople. An archbishop, with considerable independent powers, was appointed for Bulgaria. He was himself a Bulgar and with a train of bishops and priests he left for his archbishopric where once more everything Latin was replaced by Greek. Thus the victory in this affair remained with Constantinople. Not that the Papacy acquiesced in it. Much expostulation, many exhortations, and the sternest threats issued from the Pope, but no one paid any attention. But the time came when the sagacious Photius, now again Patriarch, thought it prudent to try to secure the Pope's recognition of his status. The Pope agreed provided that Bulgaria was restored to him.

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The matter was once more submitted to a Council (in 879) which, surprisingly, decided that Bulgaria should be returned to Rome. But Boris refused to be returned to Rome. It is possible that this was a contingency which had been foreseen by Photius, but in any case he loyally abode by the agreement reached, sent no more clergy to Bulgaria, and remained on good terms with Nicholas's successor, John VIII. The final decision had, however, been reached and the Bulgarian Church was to remain within the orbit of Orthodoxy. One other aspect of Boris's policy remained to be realized. To make his Church a really national institution, worship must be in the language of the people, to whom the bewildering changes from Greek to Latin had meant but the substitution of one foreign language for another.

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The disciples of Methodius, who had just been expelled from Moravia provided Boris with precisely what he needed. The less important of these unfortunate men had been dubbed heretics and sold as such into slavery, the more prominent leaders, Gorazd, Clement and others more politely conducted to the Danube and bidden to cross it, never to return.

Boris gave them a cordial welcome, and under his patronage they did a great work, far-reaching and permanent, for Slav Christianity and culture. A centre for the training of a Slav clergy was established, a Slav Bulgarian Church was organized, and many translations into the Slav language were made. Boris was wise and skilful enough to effect these changes without offending Byzantium and his own Greek hierarchy, and the latter were in due course replaced by Slav bishops. Thus through Clement of Okhrida and his companions the work of the Apostles of the Slavs bore a rich harvest among the Slavs of the Balkans. For the political ascendency of Bulgaria continued to grow until for a while it wrested the hegemony from Constantinople itself. Boris's successor, Simon, was an outstanding personality, who not only decisively defeated the Byzantines in war, and had himself crowned with an imperial title, but himself a scholar and erstwhile monk, carried on his father's ecclesiastical and cultural policy and declared the Bulgarian Church autocephalous. Thus was welded into shape in Bulgaria a cultural and religious instrument which was ready to hand when needed for the evangelization of Russia.

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viction that the world was to be subdued to Islam. If the people they conquered were simple pagans they were offered the crisp alternative of accepting either Islam or death. But the Jews and the Christians were different. They were recognized as being, like the Mohammedans themselves, People of the Book. Each had a scripture, a written record of revelation. Their faith was regarded by the Turks as true but incomplete, since Mahomet had superseded both Moses and Christ. 798

The Orthodox were, therefore, permitted to survive and to practise their religion, but under severe restrictions. They had to pay tribute, to wear a distinctive dress and to conform to other irritating and humiliating regulations. In practising their religion they had to refrain from letting any outward sign of it be seen or heard, there were to be no crosses, for instance, on their churches, and no bells were to be rung. All this was the letter of the Law, nor was there any guarantee that it would be adhered to by the victorious Turkish governors; indeed, it was often violated by a harsh sultan or a blood-thirsty local administrator. There was much suffering and many instances of martyrdom. Doubtless there were many cases of apostasy also.[1] Social pressure was a more effective agent in winning converts to Islam than deliberate oppression and direct official action.[2] Its results are to be seen in the atrophy of the Christian Church in North Africa, and in the considerable number of adherents which Islam gained at the expense of Christianity in the Balkans.

But it is the glory of the Orthodox people as a whole that under centuries of Turkish oppression and misrule, with every inducement to abandon their religion, they remained faithful to it in spite of all.

For purposes of administration under the Turks the Orthodox Church became the *Rum Millet*—the Roman nation, with the Ecumenical Patriarch as its recognized head and representative. That is to say the Patriarch of Constantinople 793 659.

[1] See Latourette: *A History of the Expansion of Christianity*, Vol. III, p. 71 and f. London, 1945.

[2] It has been discovered in modern Russia that religion is like a nail, the harder you hit it, the deeper it goes in, and that the subtler policy of leaving social pressure to do its work is the wisest course for those who hope to see the disappearance of religion.

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793 •659 was given civil jurisdiction over all the Orthodox within the Turkish Empire; he was responsible for their behaviour, they could approach the Government only through him. Thus, to his former claim to ecclesiastical precedence over the other Eastern Patriarchs, was now added a delegated civil jurisdiction as well.

The result was a signal example of the corrupting influence of power. The temptation to use secular authority as a means to ecclesiastical aggrandizement was strong, and it is one of the ironies of history that the Turkish régime led to the steady expansion of the spiritual jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. It reached its climax in the eighteenth century when the Churches of Rumania, Bulgaria and Serbia were brought under its sway and the Patriarchate extended right across Asia Minor. But the price paid was seen in the Patriarch's relation with his Turkish masters.

He was obliged to receive his "berat" from an infidel source, that is the confirmation of both his spiritual and secular authority. He was removed, and sometimes more than once reinstated, at the Sultan's will, and this combination of humiliating loss of prestige with the prize of rich emoluments led to a long and depressing story of simony and intrigue. There have been notable exceptions and some Patriarchs have suffered deprivation and even death for their principles. But over long periods of time the acquisition and tenure of the Patriarchate was a matter of intrigue and money, and the precarious nature of the dignity is reflected in the fact that "out of 159 Patriarchs who have held office between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries, the Turks have, on 105 occasions, driven Patriarchs from their throne; there have been 27 abdications, often involuntary; 6 Patriarchs have suffered violent deaths by hanging, poisoning or drowning; and only 21 have died natural deaths while in office."[1] During the seventy-five years from 1625 to 1700, there were 50 Patriarchs—an average of eighteen months each.[2]

793 Nor was the evil limited to the Patriarchate itself. The party which had bought the office for their nominee recovered

[1] Kidd: *The Churches of Eastern Christendom* (1927), p. 304.
[2] Fortescue: *The Orthodox Eastern Church* (1907), p. 242.

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795 781 according to their own account, by community of faith and love. In this respect their life is in striking contrast with the fissiparous tendencies displayed by the West. The Orthodox Church includes men of different races and languages, they are frankly national in outlook, they worship in the language of the people, not in a common and liturgical tongue. There are marked divergencies of temperament, especially between Greek and Slav which run like an undercurrent beneath the surface of their history and threaten disruption, as much now as ever. Yet in spite of all this the Orthodox Communion holds together and retains its identity. The case of Bulgaria serves but to underline the fact. For the schism which occurred in 1871 between Constantinople and the Bulgarian Church, precisely on the grounds of what the former regarded as the excessive nationalism of the latter, has now at length been healed, and Bulgaria is once more restored to the full communion of Orthodoxy. This unity in diversity which maintains itself in the face of so many factors which might make for disintegration, and which owes its existence to no coercive principle but to bonds which are intangible and belong to the moral and spiritual sphere, is an impressive fact of which a disordered world may well take note.

795 • 659 If the life of the Orthodox Church in past centuries has been conspicuously defensive, a rôle of guardianship of its faith and a willingness to suffer in its defence, the twentieth century has revealed the fact that such a life has not ceased to be the vocation of Orthodoxy. The geographical situation of the Orthodox peoples in Eastern Europe places them in a peculiarly exposed position in the conflict which atheistic Communism wages with all forms of religion. This conflict is something new in the modern world. The Christian creed and way of life have been rejected before by individual people or small groups. Alternative creeds have been proposed and accepted, more or less in the seclusion of the study. But the twentieth century has seen the proclamation of rival creeds to the Christian in the market place, publicly, with explicit claims to be superior, supported by argument and backed perhaps by force. Communism, with its definite philosophy of history and its altruistic appeal on behalf of the downtrodden

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and oppressed, has made vast numbers of converts at the expense of Christianity.

This is not the place to discuss the compatibility of Communism with Christianity in theory. It has claims to be regarded as in itself a religion, inasmuch as it has its own philosophy of life which is totalitarian in character, and an equipment of fundamental ideas which claims the allegiance of the whole personality and seeks to control every aspect of life. It insists upon rigid and impeccable orthodoxy in its party members; it has its heresy hunts in the form of purges, its sacred texts and its official interpretation of them. Like Christianity itself, it has its Golden Age in the future, not in the past, but for the Communist the Golden Age will be reached within the confines of this world and within historical time.

Communism has secured political power in the countries of Eastern Europe and here it finds itself face to face with Orthodoxy. If in Yugoslavia the interesting fact has come to light that politically Communism can assume a form which deviates in some respects from the Soviet pattern, yet its attitude to religion remains that of Communism elsewhere when in power. The crux of the conflict lies in the fact that Christianity also claims the whole man, body, soul and spirit, and neither can in theory tolerate the existence of another *total* allegiance. The clash is emphasized by the fact that Communism regards this other allegiance as an aberration of the human mind, and the idea of the spiritual principle in man as an illusion.

So far as words are concerned freedom of religion is guaranteed under Communist rule, but the Communist has his own meaning for the word freedom, as he has for many other words, and in practice Orthodoxy, in common with other forms of religion, faces attack.

It is subject on the one hand to a stream of propaganda of which perhaps the most potent aspect is the explicit assumption that religion is due simply to lack of education. On the other hand it suffers from insidious attempts to undermine the position of religious leaders and to discredit them in public opinion. This may culminate in a trial, the pattern of which has become familiar and may include the uncanny and macabre "confession" of the accused.

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Meanwhile, pending the disappearance of religion under the influence of enlightened education, Communism is prepared to use it as a tool. Like art, literature, history and science, religion also is to be pressed or cajoled whenever possible into the service of the Communist *Weltanschauung*. The case of Bulgaria may suffice as an instance: In June, 1948, a letter was sent from the Department for Religious Affairs in the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry to the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the head of which, the Exarch Stepan, with the Synod behind him, had attracted the attention of the Government by his wise but firm attitude in defence of the rights of the Church and the claims of religion. The letter contained the following sentences:

"The representatives of the Church must not criticize the people's rising of 9th September, 1944, and the subsequent change of government."

"The nationalization of private industry and the mines must have the approval and daily support of the hierarchy of the Church."

"The representatives of the Church must stress, in their daily work, their respect for the State and their acknowledgment that the State stands above the Church, and that the Church fulfils the laws of the People's Republic and the State's discipline."

"It is further required that the Church should make certain changes in the educational system of her institutes where—the government claims—subjects are taught which contradict the scientific knowledge of the evolution of nature and society and which are opposed to the democratic and progressive spirit."

"It is desirable that the Church use the pulpit, the Church press and private talks for the education of the faithful in love for the state leaders of Bulgaria and Soviet Russia and to ask that their portraits be placed in public places and private homes."

There was, moreover, a significant note that the reply to this letter should be signed individually by each member of the Synod.

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The solid front of the Synod disintegrated under pressure brought to bear upon its individual members, and Stepan found himself obliged to resign.

The general picture must not be drawn too much in sheer black and white. There is a Communism which is not the sworn foe of religion; and even when it is, it is well to recall Berdyaev's frequent warning that even the fight against God may be a form of affirming God if it is a protest against unworthy conceptions of God which have allowed cruelty and injustice to prevail in human life.[1]

But so far as the Orthodox Church in the Communist State is concerned, we may remember that Orthodoxy has tried conclusions with the secular power before. In the interests of political unity the Byzantine Emperors often tried to force it to come to terms with heresy, as later they endeavoured to impose upon it union with Rome upon Rome's conditions in order to save the State. There was everything to be said for the Emperor's attitude from the worldly point of view and much perhaps from the spiritual point of view also. But Orthodoxy refused to compromise. Henri Grégoire assures us that it is no paradox to represent the religious history of Byzantium as a conflict between the Church and the State, from which the Church emerged unquestionably the victor.[2]

Orthodoxy lived for centuries under the harsh Government of the Turk. But with the coming of political emancipation, it is found to have retained its faith intact, its identity unimpaired and its unity preserved. It has known how to bend before the storm and, unbroken, to abide its time. Doubtless it has had its sinners, its time-servers even in high places. But the two-fold cry of Orthodoxy "Lord have mercy" and "Glory be to Thee O Lord", has rung out above them all, and still rings out. The host of its saints and prelates and of common folk held fast to their faith in the power of the Resurrection to transform the whole world, and they have seen and see in Orthodoxy the authentic faith of Christ, for which many of them have been prepared to die.

[1] See the Report of the Lambeth Conference, 1948, Part II, p. 20 ff., London, 1948.

[2] Baynes and Moss: *Byzantium*, p. 130.

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IV

SOURCES OF ANCIENT MAGIC AND MEDICINE

I

During the pagan and semi-pagan period the Slavs lived in small, independent tribes, later forming loose federations within territorial limits. For long the Greeks were unable to negotiate with them, because they did not agree among themselves and had no central authority. The organisation of a united state in Rascia coincided with the establishment of state Christianity, and the pagan empire of Bulgaria was comparatively short-lived.

The tribal religious cult was likely to have been an extension of a domestic cult, probably rarely accompanied by the specialised functions of an official priesthood. The domestic cult lasts to the present day. The head of the household officiates in ceremonial, and the assistance of an outsider is not essential. In ceremonial which involves the whole tribe or village, the heads of households—the tribal elders—are again responsible; but that they have not an entire monopoly of ritual is evident in ceremonies which are performed by a group without a specially chosen leader, particularly those which belong to the younger people, or ceremonies conducted by old women doctors, etc.[1]

[1] The rites of the peasants hint also at an independent development. It is not true only that the non-Christian element enjoyed a revival, tended to revert to type, after the fall of the mediaeval empire. A direction was taken at that time, perhaps, in which the popular religion continued a course of development and adaptation. The popular religion, or sometimes a popular aversion to religion as well as to social forms that flourished under a feudal church, must have sought new outlets much earlier. Local forms of peasant cults must be of comparatively recent growth, and contain more than the survivals of an ancient paganism. The *slava*, for instance, is a typical example of a domestic rite which does not require a special priesthood. It has become perhaps the central